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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----------oOo----------
TERRY LYNNE JONES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
WILLIAM K. HINKLE and 
KATHRYN P. HINKLE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
----------oOo----------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This in an action by Plaintiff-Appellant (hereinafter 
referred to as "Plaintiff") for specific performance alleg-
edly due from Defendant-Respondents (hereinafter referred to 
as "Defendants") under a Uniform Real Estate Contract and 
for damages allegedly incurred as a result of the failure of 
Defendants to perform thereunder. The action also involves 
a Counterclaim by Defendants for attorney's fees incurred in 
defense of the performance sought by Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LmlER COURT 
This matter was heard by the Court upon ~lotions for 
summary Judgment filed by both parties. From an Order of the 
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Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Christine ~1. Durham presiding, dismissing the 
complaint of Plaintiff with prejudice anct awarding Defen-
dants the sum of $500.00 as attorney's fees, upon their 
counterclaim, Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to have the Judgment of the Trial Court 
affirmed and to have this Court award Defendants additional 
attorney's fees for defending this matter on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is very thorough. A 
correction should be made, however, at page 6 of Plaintiff's 
Brief, in the second full paragraph, in what would appear to 
be a mere typographical error. The record, including page 
45 of the transcript, clearly indicates that the rate of 
interest Plaintiff paid Defendants under the contract was 
more, not "less", than the rate paid by Defendants to Deseret 
Federal. In addition, it should be noted that the counsel 
for the parties stipulated before the Court that $500.00 
would be reasonable attorney's fees for the services rendered 
up to the time of the Judgment. [Tr. 60) 
- 2 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff argues that the Trial Court erred in granting 
Summary Judgment in this matter since other evidence may 
have been adduced at trial to ascertain the meaning and 
intent of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Plaintiff 
relies on the general principle set forth by this Court in 
Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 U.2d 98, 306 
P.2d 773 (1957), for the proposition that the Court should 
have looked to the four corners of the instrument, other 
contemporaneous writings and extrinsic parole evidence of 
their intentions, before concluding the meaning of the 
contract and, more specifically, the paragraphs under consid-
eration. 
Plaintiff misinterprets the Court's statement in Contin-
ental, however. It was merely setting forth the Order in 
which the Court should look of various items. It does not 
change the general rule that the Court will not look to any 
contemporaneous writings or other evidence to interpret a 
contract unless the meaning cannot be ascertained from the 
contract itself. The Court in Continental, supra., specifi-
cally explained this concept, immediately following the 
quotation cited at page 11 of Plaintiff's Brief: 
If the ambiguity can be reconciled from 
a reasonable interpretation of the 
instrument, extrinsic evidence should 
not be allowed. (Citing cases) 
- 3 -
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This general rule was expressed as grounds for revising 
the Judgment of the Trial Court in E.A. Strout Western Realli 
Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1974), whereir 
the Court explained: 
Parole evidence may be received to clarify 
ambiguous language in a contract, to show 
what the agreement was related to filling 
in blanks and to supply omitted terms which 
were agreed upon but inadvertenty left out 
of the written agreement. However, under 
the general rule, which is applicable here, 
parole evidence may not be qiven to change 
the terms of a written agreement which are 
clear, definite, and unambiguous. (522 P.2d 
at 145) 
Again, in Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah, 1979), 
cited at pp. 9-11 of Plaintiff's Brief, the Court noted: 
Deeds are to be construed like other 
vnitten instruments, and where a deed 
is plain and unambiguous, parol evidence 
is not admissible to vary its terms. It 
is the court's duty to construe a deed as 
it is written, and in the final analysis, 
each instrument must be construed in the 
light of its own language and peculiar facts. 
It is also well know that the intention of 
the parties to a conveyance is open to inter-
pretation only when the words used are anbig-
uous. (596 P.2d at 656) 
To the same effect, see Cornwall v. Hillow Creek Country Club 
13 U.2d 160, 369 P.2d 928 (1962); Mark Steel Corporation v. 
Eimco Corporation, 548 P.2d 892 (Utah, 1976); and Jaye Smith 
Construction v. Board of Education, Granite School District, 
560 P.2d 320 (Utah, 1977); and Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 
P.2d 690 (Utah, 1977). 
- 4 -
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The Plaintiff further misinterprets what this court has 
determined to constitute an ambiguity. Plaintiff contends 
that the contract must be ambiguous since: 
It is Plaintiff's position that the 
contract means what it says. It is 
apparently Defendants' position that 
the contract means something else. 
Although neither party has claimed 
that the contract is ambiguous, the 
respective positions of the parties 
imply that the Court need interpret 
the contract. (Plaintiff's Brief p. 11) 
However, a contractual term is not ambiguous merely 
because the two parties interpret it differently. This 
Court, in Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Association, 589 
P.2d 780 (Utah, 1979), examined the meaning of a provision 
of an insurance policy term, "medical equipment", which 
Plaintiff contended included a specially equipped van and 
which the insurance company claimed did not include such a 
van. The Court held that there was no ambiguity to construe 
against the drafter of the agreement, explaining: 
Nor can we say the policy provision 
quoted above is ambiguous. A term is 
not necessarily ambiguous simply 
because one party seeks to endow it 
with a different meaning from that 
relied on by the drafter. (589 
P.2d at 782) 
Further, in the case at bar, the ambiguity claimed by 
Plaintiff to exist in the contract was between the language 
of paragraph 8 of the standard printed language of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and the language added 
- 5 -
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by the parties in paragraph 3 of that Contract, which stated 
that the contract balance of $40,000 was to be paid: 
Three hundred thirteen dollars and sixty 
cents or more on or before the 12th day of 
June and Three hundred thirteen dollars 
and sixty cents on or before the 12th day 
of each month thereafter until contract 
balance is paid in full, together with all 
interest accrued and in addition Buyer 
to make one balloon payment in the amount 
of $8,163.22 (Eight thousand one hundred 
sixty-three and twenty-two cents) on or 
before May 12, 1978. Said payment to 
include 1/12 of property taxes and 1/12 cf 
hazard insurance monthly. If taxes and 
insurance increase, monthly payments to be 
adjusted accordingly. The buyers shall pay 
interest on the balloon payment of 9-1/2 
interest until paid in full. (Emphasis 
added) ( Tr. 13) 
clearly, the foregoing language contemplated a continuing 
contract with the Respondents until the $40,000 balance was 
paid in full. This language cannot be made amhiguous by 
other terms of the agreement since, in the event of such 
potential ambiguity, the terms added to the printed contract 
hy the parties would govern. Ser> l'ollanrl v. Er01:n, 1': P.21 
422, 394 P.2d 77 (1964) and Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 
P.2d 538 (Utah, 1977). 
In accordance with the foregoing, it is generally held 
that the interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for 
the Court to decide, justifying Summary Judgment. In Overson 
v. United Sates Fidelity and Guaranty, 587 P.2d 149 (Utah, 
1978), this concept was emphasized in denying an appeal 
- 6 -
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from a directed verdict for the defendant, wherein the 
appellant claimed the insurance policy was ambiguous. The 
court explained: 
All of these facts being undisputed, 
there is no genuine issue of fact to 
be resolved. The accepted principle 
is that the interpretation of a con-
tract's language is usually a law 
matter. This principle was articulated 
in the case of Central Credit Collection 
Corp. v. Grayson as follows: 
'Interpretation of a written contract is 
usually a question of law for the court. 
If its terms are clear and unambiguous, 
summary judgment is proper. Even 
where some ambiguity exists in the 
contract, resolution of the ambiguity 
is still a question of law for the 
court, unless contradictory evidence 
is presented to clarify the ambiguity.' 
Therefore, because there is no dispute 
as to material fact the court could 
properly have granted USF & G's motion 
for summary judgment. (587 P.2d at 151) 
See also Pacific States Lost Iron Pike Co. v. Harsh Utah 
Corporation, 5 U.2d 244, 300 P.2d 610 (1956), cited by the 
Court in support of Overson, supra. 
Based upon all of the foregoing, Respondents respect-
fully submit that the Trial Court properly determined that 
the contract, as a matter of law, precluded the relief 
sought by Plaintiff and, therefore, properly granted 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing 
Plaintiff's Complaint, with prejudice. 
- 7 -
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AvlARDED 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANTS FOR 
THE DEFENSE OF THIS ACTION 
The general rule in Utah is clearly that, in the absence 
of a contractual provision or statute, attorney's fees are 
not recoverable, unless eguity permits otherwise. See ~ 
Homes v. Greater Park City, 529 P.2d 620 (Utah, 1979)' 
B & R SUEElY Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 U.2d 44 2, 503 P.2d 
1216 ( 1972) i and Blake v. Blake, 17 u. 2d 369, 412 P.26 4 5~ 
(1966). However, in the case at bar, attorney's fees are 
provided for in the contract at issue. That contract (a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract) provides, at paragraph 2: 
The Buyer and Seller each agree that should 
they default in any of the covenants or agree-
ments contained herein, that the defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and expenses, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee, which 
may arise or accrue from enforcing this 
agreement, or in obtaining possession of 
the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing 
any remedy provided hereunder or by the 
statutes of the State of Utah whether such 
remeGy is pursued by filing a suit or other-
wise. (Tr. 14) 
Based upon that provision and the other provisions of 
that contract, the Trial Court reasonably and properly 
concluded that this was a type of situation reasonably 
within the contemplation of the parties, where attorney's 
fees would be incurred and awarded as part of the Court's 
Judgment. The reasonableness of the amount of that award 
- 8 -
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($500.00) was stipulated to by counsel (Tr. 60) and is not 
being challenged by Plaintiff in this Appeal. 
Furthermore, this Court in Swain v. Salt Lake Real 
Estate and Investment Company, 3 U.2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 
(1955) held that a substantially similar matter justified 
the award of attorney's fees under the identical provision 
of another Uniform Real Estate Contract. There, the vendor 
brought an action to declare a forfeiture of the contract. 
The Trial Court rendered Judgment for the defendant purchaser, 
but denied attorney's fees on the basis that there had been 
no default and paragraph 21 applied only to situations where 
one of the parties defaulted in one of the covenants or 
agreements contained in the contract. The Court, in modifying 
the lower Court's Judgment to include $250.00 attorney's 
fees, explained that this was an action for "enforcing the 
agreement" and, therefore, within the meaning and intent of 
paragraph 21. The Court explained: 
The contract provides that 'The Buyer 
and Seller each agree that should they 
default in any of the covenants and 
agreements contained herein, to pay all 
costs and expenses that may arise from 
enforcing this agreement, either by suit 
or otherwise, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee.' It was held in the case 
of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P.206, 
under a similar provision, that the vendor 
could not claim attorney's fees in an unlawful 
detainer action after declaration of forfeiture. 
The court reasoned that such an action was 
- 9 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not one for 'enforcing the agreement' but 
rather one outside the contract. Such is not 
the present case, for while the seller 
sought to forfeit the contract, the buyer 
maintained his rights under the contract 
and incurred costs in enforcing the agree-
ment. The parties contracted to pay such 
costs and stipulated that $250 would be 
reasonable. 
In short, this Court logically concluded that enforcement~ 
a contract necessarily includes defenses from such enforce-
ment. 
SiMilarly, in the case at bar, the Plaintiff eEcic":;vnre0 
to force Defendants to transfer the property, subject to the 
existing mortgage thereon, and to allow Defendants to assume 
that existing Mortgage, allegedly in accordance with the 
provisions of the contract. Defendants defended against 
such a transfer on the basis that their rights under that 
contract were to receive certain monies from Plaintiff until 
the balance of the amounts due uncer the contract had been 
received. Defendants were, therefore, maintaining their 
rights under the contract and thereby incurred the at~orney'o 
fees in question, as contemplated in paragraph 21 of the 
Contract, in enforcing the agreement. (Tr. 14) 
Defendants submit that they were entitled to the at tor-
ney's fees awarded by the Trial Court and that the Trial 
Court properly awarded the same as part of its Judgment 
dismissing Plaintiff's CoMplaint. 
- 10 -
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POINT III 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO BE AvlARDED 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THIS APPEAL 
Similarly to Point II, Defendants respectfully submit 
that they should be awarded the attorney's fees reasonably 
incurred in the defense of this Appeal, which reasonable 
amount Defendants claim to be $750.00. 
The general rule in such matter is set forth in an 
excellent annotation at 52 A.L.R.2d 862, wherein thr authors 
note: 
In cases in which a contractual provision 
for attorneys' fees existed in favor of 
a particular party, and such party was 
successful in the trial court but was 
required to defend against an unsuccess-
ful appeal of the losing party, additional 
attorneys' fees have been allowed for the 
appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to address this 
issue in several cases and has indicated that the award of 
such fees on appeal are within the discretion of this Court. 
In Swain, supra., this Court refused to allow attorney's 
fees on appeal under the particular circumstances of that 
case, but indicated that in a proper case, such fees would 
be allowed. The Court stated: 
Since it appears probable that after the 
issues were drawn, the only real contest 
below was that concerning the award of 
an attorney's fee, we are of the opinion 
that the stipulated amount of such fee 
should cover services rendered in the 
court below and on appeal. Attorney's 
fees on appeal are discretionary with 
this court and, under the facts of this 
- 11 -
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case, we are of the persuasion that no 
additional fee should be allowed. (279 
P.2d at 711) 
In Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah, 1976), this Court 
confronted the issue of additional attorney's fees on appe~ 
and, apparently due to the fact that the matter at issue ~~ 
a divorce and both parties had appealed, the majority of the 
Court held that the matter should be remanded for a determi~ 
ation of ~1hat amount, if any, should be awarded as additional 
attorney's fees for the appeal. Former Chief Justice Ellett, 
with the concurrence of Justice Maughan, concurred with the 
majority opinion, indicating that their differences were 
over which Court should determine the issue of additional 
attorney's fees on appeal. Justice Ellett explained: 
I concur except as to the remanding of 
this case to permit the trial court to 
determine whether attorney's fees should 
be awarded on appeal. 
The awarding of attorney's fees on 
appeal is a matter entirely within 
discretion of the appellate court. 
See Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate 
and Investment Company, 3 Utah 2d 
121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); and 5 Am 
Jur.2d Appeal and Error, Sec. 1022. 
(558 P.2d at 516) 
\'1hile the specific fact situation in Eastman, supra. 
reguired, in the opinion of a majority of the Court, a dete~ 
mination of the Trial Court as to what amount of additional 
attorney's fees should be awarded for the appeal, it clearly 
- 12 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
establishes that additional attorney's fees should be awarded 
for the defense of an appeal, at least where an appropriate 
basis for the attorney's fees on the initial trial exists. 
On a matter such as that in the case at bar, the award of 
attorney's fees is required if the intention of the parties 
is to be carried out and the seller (Defendants) are to 
receive the full amount of the debt without deduction for 
legal expenses. 
An excellent summary of this rationale is found in 
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 91 Idaho 544, 428 P.2d 50 (1967), 
wherein the Court explained: 
Plaintiff by motion duly served and 
filed herein, seeks additional attorneys 
fees in defending this appeal. The 
promissory note provides for reasonable 
attorneys' fees in the event suit be 
brought to enforce the note. The pur-
pose of such a contractual provision in 
the note 'is to indemnify the creditor 
against the necessity of paying an 
attorney's fee * * * and to enable him 
to recover the full amount of his debt 
without deduction for legal expenses.' 
Hahn v. Hahn, 124 Cal.App.2d 97, 103, 
266 P.2d 519, 523 (1954). Although 
several jurisdictions have held in 
similar situations that attorneys' 
fees should not be allowed for 
successfully defending an appeal on 
various grounds, i.e., that the con-
tract was merged in the judgment or 
that the fees were not within the 
contemplation of the parties (See: 
Annot.: 52 A.L.R.2d 863 at 871), the 
more recent and in our opinion the 
better reasoned cases allow such fees 
on appeal. It is our conclusion that 
the plaintiff is entitled to fees for 
the services of her attorneys in 
defending this appeal. Otherwise, the 
- 13 -
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amount of her recovery on the defendant's 
contractual obligation would be reduced 
contrary to the purpose of the contractual 
provision for payment of attorneys' fees 
in the event of suit brought to enforce 
the note. Steele v. Vanderslice, 90 
Ariz. 277, 367 P.2d 636 (1961); Anderson 
v. Hiatt, 181 Cal.App.2d 9, 4 Cal.Rptr. 
858 (Cal.App.1960). Hahn v. Hahn, 123 
Cal.App.2d 97, 266 P.2d 519 (Cal.App.1954); 
Puget Sound Mutual Savings Bank v. Lil-
lions, 50 Wash.2d 799, 314 P.2d 935 (1957). 
Ciriffiele v. Shinazy, 134 Cal.App.2d SO, 
285 P.2d 311, 52 A.L.R.2d 860 (Cal.App. 
1955). Annat: 52 A.L.R.2d 863; 17 Am. 
Jur.2d Contracts §292, p. 708. 
similarly, in the case at bar, the contract provided 
for such inde~nification against legal and other expenses 
resulting from the enforcement of the contract and, therefore, 
it is not unreasonable for the Defendants to regues~ the 
award of attorney's fees for the defense of this appeal. 
It is respectfully submitted that an attorney's fee of 
$750.00 is an extremely reasonable fee for such an appeal in 
view of the amount of time necessarily involved in preparatior 
of a Supreme Court Brief and arguing a matter such as this 
to this Court. Defendants respectfully submit, therefore, 
that an additional award of $750.00 attorney's fees should 
be made to Defendants as part of the Order of this Court 
affirming the decision of the Trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully submit that the Trial Court's 
action in this matter was fully in accord vlith the principals 
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enunciated by this Court in earlier matters and should be 
affirmed. The Contract in this matter, as a ~atter of law, 
simply did not create any right on the part of the Plaintiff 
to the relief sought from that Court. Since substantial 
attorney's fees were incurred in the defense of the Plaintiff's 
unfounded claim, the Court properly awarded Defendants 
Judgment upon their Counterclaim for the reasonable amount 
of such fees, so that Defendants would still receive the 
full amount of the debt, as agreed to under that Contract. 
For the same reason, it is respectfully submitted, this 
Court should award Defendants an additional $750.00 as 
attorney's fees on this Appeal, pursuant to paragraph 21 of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract. (Tr. 14) 
Respectfully submitted this ~~of October, 
1979. 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
c ------;r-
By .--z -~"' 
DEAN 
GA!1Y • ATKIN 
Att: rneys for 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
